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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Robert Jenkins, a Pennsylvania prisoner at State 
Correctional Institution – Laurel Highlands, seeks federal 
habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”).  The District Court ordered the dismissal of 
Jenkins‟s habeas petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d).  For the reasons stated below, we hold that Jenkins 
is eligible for statutory tolling of AEDPA‟s limitation period.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court‟s order. 
 
 
 3 
I. 
The resolution of this appeal turns on its detailed 
procedural history.  Jenkins was convicted by a jury of 
several drug-related offenses for which he was sentenced by 
the York County Common Pleas Court to a multi-year term of 
incarceration.  He timely filed a notice of appeal, but the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed his conviction.  
Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 928 A.2d 1124 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2007).  He also timely filed a petition for allowance of appeal, 
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on September 
28, 2007.  Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 932 A.2d 1286 (Pa. 
2007).  He did not petition for certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
On October 1, 2008, Jenkins timely filed a petition 
pursuant to Pennsylvania‟s Post Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq., which the 
Common Pleas Court denied.
1
  He timely filed a notice of 
                                              
1
 Pursuant to the Pennsylvania prisoner mailbox rule, 
“the date of delivery of the PCRA petition by the defendant to 
the proper prison authority or to a prison mailbox is 
considered the date of filing of the petition.”  Commonwealth 
v. Castro, 766 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Little, 716 A.2d 1287, 1288 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1998)) (emphasis omitted).  Here, the record does 
not reflect the date on which Jenkins placed his PCRA 
petition in the prison mailing system.  Thus, we reference the 
date on which the Common Pleas Court docketed his PCRA 
petition. 
 4 
appeal, but his attorney moved to withdraw pursuant to 
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(en banc).  The Superior Court granted his attorney‟s motion 
to withdraw and affirmed the Common Pleas Court‟s denial 
of his PCRA petition on November 10, 2009.  Commonwealth 
v. Jenkins, 988 A.2d 721 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). 
 On December 2, 2009, Jenkins filed a pro se pleading 
with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entitled, “Motion to 
File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, and for 
the Appointment of Counsel.”  In his pleading, he 
acknowledged that the deadline to file a petition for 
allowance of appeal was December 10, 2009.  He also 
admitted that the Superior Court had allowed his attorney to 
withdraw.  Finally, he claimed:  (1) “I do not have the legal 
understanding to adequately file my own petition for 
allowance of appeal[,]” and (2) “[t]he person helping me with 
this filing is expecting to be transferred, and there is nobody 
else I can trust.”  (App. at 117a). 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court notified the Superior 
Court that Jenkins had filed a petition for allowance of 
appeal.  However, on December 16, 2009, the Supreme Court 
issued Jenkins a defective filing notice, which stated that his 
pleading failed to comply with certain Pennsylvania Rules of 
Appellate Procedure unrelated to timing.  Jenkins promptly 
perfected his pleading on December 29, 2009.  Nonetheless, 
on April 27, 2010, the Supreme Court denied his pleading in 
an unpublished per curiam order without opinion.  
Commonwealth v. Jenkins, No. 219 MM 2009, 2010 Pa. 
LEXIS 921 (Pa. Apr. 27, 2010). 
 5 
 On May 7, 2010, Jenkins filed a pro se habeas petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
2
  The District Court, sua 
sponte, raised the issue of timeliness, ordered briefing, and 
ultimately dismissed his habeas petition as untimely and 
denied a certificate of appealability.
3
  Jenkins v. 
Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, No. 3-10-cv-00984, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117659 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2010).  
This timely appeal followed.  Determining that reasonable 
                                              
2
 Jenkins executed his habeas petition on May 2, 2010.  
Pursuant to the federal prisoner mailbox rule, “a document is 
deemed filed on the date it is given to prison officials for 
mailing.”  Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 391 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2011).  However, in order to benefit from this rule, “the 
inmate is required to make a declaration that sets forth the 
date of deposit and that first-class postage has been prepaid.”  
Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 315 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001), 
overruled on other grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 
(2002) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)).  Because Jenkins failed 
to comply with these prerequisites, he is not entitled to benefit 
from this rule.  In any event, the five-day difference would 
not affect the outcome here. 
3
 The District Court had “the power to raise the 
AEDPA limitations issue sua sponte[,]” United States v. 
Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc), and it 
appropriately gave Jenkins notice that a potential timeliness 
issue existed and provided him with an opportunity to 
respond, id. at 165 n.15 (citing Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 
707 (4th Cir. 2002); Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 121 (2d 
Cir. 2000)). 
 6 
jurists could disagree with the District Court‟s dismissal of 
Jenkins‟s habeas petition as untimely, we granted a certificate 
of appealability. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Jenkins‟s 
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We 
have jurisdiction over Jenkins‟s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1291 and 2253.  We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court‟s refusal to toll AEDPA‟s limitation period.  
Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2003). 
III. 
 AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period for a 
state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1).  As applicable here, AEDPA‟s limitation period 
runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by 
. . . the expiration of the time for seeking [direct] review[.]”  
§ 2244(d)(1)(A).  Also as applicable here, the expiration of 
the time for seeking direct review is the deadline for 
petitioning for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.  
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012). 
 On direct review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
denied Jenkins‟s petition for allowance of appeal on 
September 28, 2007.  Jenkins, 932 A.2d 1286.  Because 
Jenkins had ninety days to petition for certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court, his conviction became final on 
December 27, 2007.  Sup. Ct. R. 13.1.  Jenkins did not file his 
habeas petition until well over a year later on May 7, 2010; 
 7 
thus, it is untimely unless AEDPA‟s limitation period was 
tolled. 
 AEDPA‟s limitation period “does not set forth „an 
inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever‟ its „clock has 
run.‟”  Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) 
(quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 208 (2006)).  
Instead, the limitation period is subject to both statutory and 
equitable tolling.  Merritt, 326 F.3d at 161 (citing Jones v. 
Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999)).  We conclude that 
Jenkins is entitled to statutory tolling and, although 
unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal, we note that he 
makes a strong showing for equitable tolling. 
A. 
We first analyze whether Jenkins should benefit from 
statutory tolling.  A prisoner‟s “properly filed” application for 
state collateral review statutorily tolls AEDPA‟s limitation 
period during the time it is “pending.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(2).  Here, the following facts are undisputed:  
(1) Jenkins‟s October 1, 2008 PCRA petition was properly 
filed; (2) his PRCA petition was pending from October 1, 
2008, the date he filed it, to December 10, 2009, the 
expiration date for him to file a petition for allowance of 
 8 
appeal;
4
 and (3) his pleading was pending from December 2, 
2009, the date he filed it, to April 27, 2010, the date the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied it.
5
  Thus, the sole issue 
we must resolve is whether Jenkins‟s December 2, 2009 
pleading was filed properly and thereby statutorily tolled 
AEDPA‟s limitation period during its pendency. 
The answer to this question will determine whether 
Jenkins‟s habeas petition was timely.  Between the date his 
conviction became final, December 27, 2007, and the date he 
filed his PCRA petition, October 1, 2008, 279 days of 
AEDPA‟s 365-day limitation period ran.  Additionally, 
between the date the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his 
pleading, April 27, 2010, and the date he filed his habeas 
petition, May 7, 2010, 10 more days ran.  As a result, if his 
pleading was properly filed, then only those 289 days would 
have run, and his habeas petition would be timely by 76 days.  
However, if his pleading was not properly filed, then the 
                                              
4
 A PCRA petition remains pending “during the time a 
prisoner has to seek review of the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court‟s decision [by filing a petition for allowance of appeal 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] whether or not review is 
actually sought.”  Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 424 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
5
 An application for state collateral review is not 
pending during the time a prisoner has to seek review of a 
decision by a state‟s highest court by filing a petition for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.  Lawrence v. 
Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332 (2007). 
 9 
additional 138 days between the expiration date for him to 
file a petition for allowance of appeal, December 10, 2009, 
and the date the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his 
pleading, April 27, 2010, would be added to the 289 days 
already accrued.  In this scenario, 427 days would have run, 
and his habeas petition would be untimely by 62 days. 
A prisoner‟s application for state collateral review is 
“„properly filed‟ when its delivery and acceptance are in 
compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing 
filings[,]” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (emphasis 
omitted), including “time limits, no matter their form,” Pace 
v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005).  Thus, if a state 
court determines that an application is untimely, “„that [is] the 
end of the matter‟ for purposes of” statutory tolling of 
AEDPA‟s limitation period, id. at 414 (quoting Carey v. 
Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)), “regardless of whether it 
also addressed the merits of the claim, or whether its 
timeliness ruling was „entangled‟ with the merits[,]” Carey, 
536 U.S. at 226.  But if a state court fails to rule clearly on the 
timeliness of an application, a federal court “must . . . 
determine what the state courts would have held in respect to 
timeliness.”  Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006). 
At oral argument, Jenkins asserted that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not held that his pleading 
was untimely or otherwise not properly filed.  The 
Commonwealth, in turn, conceded that the Supreme Court 
may have denied Jenkins‟s pleading on the merits.  We agree 
that the Supreme Court‟s order provides no indication about 
whether it denied Jenkins‟s pleading as untimely, as 
otherwise not properly filed, or on the merits.  See Jenkins, 
 10 
2010 Pa. LEXIS 921, at *1 (“[T]he Motion to File Petition for 
Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc and for the 
Appointment of Counsel is denied.”) (formatting omitted).  
Thus, we “must look to state law governing when a petition 
for collateral relief is properly filed.”  Douglas v. Horn, 359 
F.3d 257, 262 (2004) (quoting Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 
243 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
The Commonwealth acknowledges that Jenkins filed 
his pleading before the deadline to file a petition for 
allowance of appeal.  Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 1113(a) provides that “a petition for allowance of 
appeal shall be filed with the Prothonotary of the Supreme 
Court within 30 days after the entry of the order of the 
Superior Court . . . sought to be reviewed.”  Jenkins filed his 
pleading on December 2, 2009, only twenty-two days after 
the Superior Court entered its order on November 10, 2009.  
Thus, the nunc pro tunc title of his pleading is a misnomer; in 
 11 
reality, Jenkins filed a motion to extend the time to file a 
petition for allowance of appeal.
6
 
The Commonwealth argues, however, that Jenkins‟s 
pleading was not properly filed because it was merely a 
procedural motion to enlarge the time for filing a petition 
rather than an actual substantive petition.  The 
Commonwealth bases its argument exclusively on 
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 105(b), which 
provides that a court “may not enlarge the time for filing . . . a 
petition for allowance of appeal[.]”  The District Court agreed 
                                              
6
 Because Jenkins‟s pleading was actually a motion to 
extend the time to file a petition for allowance of appeal, our 
holding in Douglas v. Horn that a prisoner‟s petition for 
allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc is not properly filed is 
distinguishable.  359 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2004).  Our 
decision in Douglas relied primarily on our reasoning in 
Brown v. Shannon, 322 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 2003).  There, we 
noted that the PCRA is “the [exclusive] means for collaterally 
attacking criminal convictions[.]”  Id. at 775 n.5 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Eller, 807 A.2d 838, 842 (Pa. 2002)).  As a 
result, we explained that a post-conviction claim, such as a 
notice of appeal nunc pro tunc, seeking reinstatement of 
appellate rights must be brought as another PCRA petition.  
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 569-70 
(Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 397 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)).  Jenkins‟s pleading is not an 
improperly filed extra-PCRA petition because it seeks the 
timely extension rather than the untimely restoration of his 
appellate rights. 
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with the Commonwealth and, consequently, held that 
Jenkins‟s pleading was not properly filed and that AEDPA‟s 
limitation period was not statutorily tolled during its 
pendency. 
Although the “[t]ime limitations on the taking of 
appeals are strictly construed and cannot be extended as a 
matter of grace[,]” Commonwealth v. Valentine, 928 A.2d 
346, 349 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Perez, 799 A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)), Rule 105(b) 
is not unyielding.  First, it “is not intended to affect the power 
of a court to grant relief in the case of fraud or breakdown in 
the processes of a court[,]” Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 
664 A.2d 133, 136 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (quoting Pa. R. App. 
P. 105 note), which may occur when a court officer “depart[s] 
from the obligations specified in . . . the Pennsylvania Rules 
of Criminal Procedure[,]” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 
A.2d 493, 499 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (citing, inter alia, 
Braykovich, 664 A.2d at 136).  Further, it does not prohibit an 
appeal nunc pro tunc when:  “(1) the appellant‟s notice of 
appeal was filed late as a result of non-negligent 
circumstances, either as they relate to the appellant or the 
appellant‟s counsel; (2) the appellant filed the notice of 
appeal shortly after the expiration date; and (3) the appellee 
was not prejudiced by the delay.”  Criss v. Wise, 781 A.2d 
1156, 1159 (Pa. 2001) (citing Bass v. Commonwealth, 401 
A.2d 1133, 1135-36 (Pa. 1979)). 
Significantly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
frequently grants–without mention of Rule 105(b)–motions to 
 13 
extend the time to file petitions for allowance of appeal,
7
 
which it sometimes characterizes as petitions for leave to file 
petitions for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc.
8
  We have 
                                              
7
 For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
published orders without explanation granting motions to 
extend the time to file petitions for allowance of appeal in the 
following criminal cases:  Commonwealth v. Diaz, 957 A.2d 
1179 (Pa. 2008) (“[T]he Petition for Extension of Time to 
File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc is 
GRANTED.”); Commonwealth v. Walker, 930 A.2d 1253 
(Pa. 2007) (“[T]he Application for Extension of Time to File 
Petition for Allowance of Appeal is granted.”). 
8
 Again, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, treating 
motions to extend the time to file petitions for allowance of 
appeal as petitions for leave to file petitions for allowance of 
appeal nunc pro tunc, published orders without explanation 
granting such pleadings in the following criminal cases:  
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 986 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2009) (“[T]he 
Petition for Extension of Time to File a Petition for 
Allowance of Appeal, treated as a Petition for Leave to File 
Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, is 
GRANTED.”); Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 982 A.2d 1220 
(Pa. 2009) (same); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 978 A.2d 348 
(Pa. 2009) (same); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 979 A.2d 837 
(Pa. 2009) (same). 
 14 
repeatedly identified a state court‟s practice of accepting a 
pleading as an important indication that the pleading is 
properly filed.  See, e.g., Kindler v. Horn, 542 F.3d 70, 77 (3d 
Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds by Beard v. Kindler, 
130 S. Ct. 612 (2009) (holding motion for reargument was 
properly filed in part because “capital defendants in 
Pennsylvania routinely seek reargument when their claims for 
relief are denied, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
granted such motions on more than one occasion”) (citations 
                                                                                                     
Additionally, in 2012 alone, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court published orders without explanation granting petitions 
for leave to file petitions for allowance of appeal nunc pro 
tunc in the following criminal cases:  Commonwealth v. 
Holloway, 54 A.3d 11 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v. Medina, 
52 A.3d 1212 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 52 
A.3d 219 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v. Lynch, 51 A.3d 179 
(Pa. 2012);  Commonwealth v. Sulcaj, 47 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 
2012); Commonwealth v. Brown, 47 A.3d 1178 (Pa. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Person, 44 A.3d 653 (Pa. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Orr, 44 A.3d 652 (Pa. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Swanson, 43 A.3d 1288 (Pa. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Kabbah, 43 A.3d 1286 (Pa. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 41 A.3d 1285 (Pa. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Clark, 40 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Sanders, 37 A.3d 587 (Pa. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 37 A.3d 587 (Pa. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. Harris, 36 A.3d 1097 (Pa. 2012). 
 15 
omitted);
9
 Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2001), 
overruled in part by Carey, 536 U.S. 214 (holding motion to 
withdraw guilty plea nunc pro tunc was properly filed in part 
because “it is not uncommon for Pennsylvania courts to 
accept [such] motions”) (citation omitted);10 Lovasz v. 
Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding second 
and subsequent PCRA petitions were properly filed even 
though “the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has announced 
strict rules regarding the granting of [such] petitions” in part 
because “courts occasionally grant relief in such 
proceedings”) (citations omitted).  For the same reason, we 
find that the Supreme Court‟s frequent granting of motions to 
extend the time to file petitions for allowance of appeal 
                                              
9
 In Kindler v. Horn, we held in part that 
Pennsylvania‟s fugitive forfeiture doctrine did not provide an 
adequate basis to bar federal habeas review.  542 F.3d 70, 78-
80 (3d Cir. 2008).  In Beard v. Kindler, the Supreme Court 
vacated our decision in Kindler and held that “a discretionary 
state procedural rule can serve as an adequate ground to bar 
federal habeas review.”  130 S. Ct. 612, 618 (2009). 
10
 We have recognized that “Carey overruled Nara to 
the extent Nara implied that an untimely petition for state 
collateral relief may be deemed „properly filed‟ under 
AEDPA.”  Satterfield v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185, 194 (3d Cir. 
2006) (citing Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 
2003)). 
 16 
undermines the Commonwealth‟s argument that Rule 105(b) 
renders Jenkins‟s pleading not properly filed.11 
In sum, we are presented with a situation in which:  
(1) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not hold that 
Jenkins‟s pleading was untimely or otherwise not properly 
filed; (2) the Supreme Court may have denied Jenkins‟s 
pleading on the merits; (3) Jenkins‟s pleading was timely 
                                              
11
 While the Commonwealth does not press the point, 
we note that Jenkins‟s pleading was not properly filed until he 
perfected it.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s defective 
filing notice informed Jenkins that he needed to provide:  
(1) “five additional copies of the pleading[,]” and (2) “[a] 
$53.50 filing fee or a copy of the trial court order granting in 
forma pauperis status together with two copies of a verified 
statement indicating that there has been no change in the 
appellant‟s financial condition since the lower court‟s order 
granting in forma pauperis and that the party is unable to pay 
the fees and costs on appeal[, s]ee generally [Pa. R. App. P.] 
551(a)(1)-(3)[, or] an application for leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis, [Pa. R. App. P.] 553-561[.]”  (App. at 115a 
(formatting omitted)).  These two deficiencies are conditions 
to filing.  See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414-15 
(2005) (recognizing copy requirements and filing fees as 
conditions to filing).  Although AEDPA‟s limitation period 
cannot be statutorily tolled between December 10, 2009, the 
expiration date for Jenkins to file a petition for allowance of 
appeal, and December 29, 2009, the date he perfected his 
pleading, this nineteen-day period does not change our 
conclusion here. 
 17 
filed; and (4) the Supreme Court has a common practice of 
granting motions to extend the time to file petitions for 
allowance of appeal notwithstanding Rule 105(b).  In these 
circumstances, we conclude that Jenkins‟s pleading was 
properly filed.  Therefore, we hold that Jenkins‟s pleading did 
statutorily toll AEDPA‟s limitation period and that his habeas 
petition was timely. 
B. 
 Although we base our decision that Jenkins‟s habeas 
petition was timely on statutory tolling, we also note that this 
appeal presents a compelling case for the application of 
equitable tolling.
12
  Because AEDPA‟s limitation period is 
not jurisdictional, Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560 (quoting Day, 
547 U.S. at 205), it is subject to equitable tolling, id. (citing, 
inter alia, Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 
617 (3d Cir. 1998)).  We extend the remedy of equitable 
                                              
12
 Jenkins “did not make any argument for the 
equitable tolling of the limitations period” before the District 
Court.  Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, No. 3-
10-cv-00984, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117659, at *11 (M.D. 
Pa. Nov. 3, 2010).  For this reason, Jenkins arguably waived 
his right to make such an argument before us.  See Tri-M Grp. 
v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (“It is axiomatic 
that „arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are 
deemed to be waived and consequently are not susceptible to 
review in this Court absent exceptional circumstances.‟”) 
(quoting United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 202 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2010)). 
 18 
tolling “only „sparingly,‟” Urcinoli v. Cathel, 546 F.3d 269, 
278 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans 
Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)), “when „principles of equity 
would make the rigid application of a limitation period 
unfair[,]‟” Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 329 (3d Cir. 
2012) (quoting Miller, 145 F.3d at 618). 
 A prisoner “is „entitled to equitable tolling‟ only if he 
shows „(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and 
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way‟ 
and prevented timely filing.”  Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562 
(quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).  Here, the Commonwealth 
does not suggest that Jenkins has not been pursuing his rights 
diligently.  Such a contention would be untenable.  Jenkins 
timely filed his:  (1) notice of direct appeal; (2) petition for 
allowance of direct appeal; (3) PCRA petition; (4) PCRA 
notice of appeal; and (5) pleading.  Jenkins also perfected his 
pleading within thirteen days of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court‟s issuance of its defective filing notice,13 and he filed 
his habeas petition within ten days of its denial of his 
                                              
13
 A diligent prisoner is one who “did what he 
reasonably thought was necessary to preserve his rights . . . 
based on information he received[.]”  Munchinski v. Wilson, 
694 F.3d 308, 331 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Holmes v. Spencer, 
685 F.3d 51, 65 (1st Cir. 2012)). 
 19 
pleading.
14
  In short, Jenkins has not been “sleeping on his 
rights[.]”  Munchinski, 694 F.3d at 331 (quoting Mathis v. 
Thaler, 616 F.3d 461, 474 (5th Cir. 2010)).
15
 
 The Commonwealth argues, however, that Jenkins has 
not shown that he “has in some extraordinary way been 
prevented from asserting his . . . rights.”  Brinson v. Vaughn, 
398 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Brown v. Shannon, 
322 F.3d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 2003)).  One potentially 
extraordinary circumstance is where a prisoner is “effectively 
abandoned” by his attorney.  Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564 
                                              
14
 A prisoner must pursue his rights diligently “during 
the period [he] is exhausting state court remedies as well” as 
during the time he is pursuing a habeas petition.  LaCava v. 
Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Jones v. 
Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
15
 Although Jenkins delayed 279 days between the date 
his conviction became final and the date he filed his PCRA 
petition, he “is not ineligible for equitable tolling simply 
because he waited until late in the limitations period to file his 
. . . petition.”  LaCava, 398 F.3d at 277 (quoting Valverde v. 
Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 20 
(quoting Nara, 264 F.3d at 320).
16
  Another “potentially 
extraordinary situation is where a court has misled a party 
regarding the steps that the party needs to take to preserve a 
claim.”  Munchinski, 694 F.3d at 329-30 (quoting Brinson, 
398 F.3d at 230).  Jenkins proposes that both of these 
extraordinary circumstances thwarted the timely filing of his 
habeas petition. 
 Jenkins first claims that his attorney abandoned him.  
However, Jenkins‟s attorney withdrew pursuant to the 
judicially sanctioned Turner/Finley process, which, among 
other requirements, mandates that an attorney serve a client 
with the “application to withdraw[,] . . . the „no-merit‟ letter[,] 
and a statement advising the petitioner that, in the event that 
the court grants the application of counsel to withdraw, he . . . 
has the right to proceed pro se or with the assistance of 
privately retained counsel.”17  Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 
                                              
16
 On the other hand, “garden variety claim[s] of 
excusable neglect,” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 
(2010) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 
89, 96 (1990)), such as “attorney error, miscalculation, 
inadequate research, or other mistakes have not been found to 
rise to the „extraordinary‟ circumstances required for 
equitable tolling[,]” LaCava, 398 F.3d at 276 (quoting 
Merritt, 326 F.3d at 169). 
17
 The Turner/Finley process also mandates an 
“[i]ndependent review of the record by competent counsel[,]” 
which “requires proof of:” 
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A.3d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth 
v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607, 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), overruled 
in part by Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2009)).  
Because his attorney engaged in significant attorney-client 
communication pursuant to the Turner/Finley process, 
Jenkins‟s abandonment argument is meritless.  Contrast 
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564 (reversing and remanding for 
further proceedings in part to determine whether attorney‟s 
repeated and prolonged failure to communicate with client 
was extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling). 
                                                                                                     
“1) A „no-merit‟ letter by PC[R]A counsel 
detailing the nature and extent of his review; 
2) The „no-merit‟ letter by PC[R]A counsel 
listing each issue the petitioner wished to have 
reviewed; 
3) The PC[R]A counsel‟s „explanation‟, in the 
„no-merit‟ letter, of why the petitioner‟s issues 
were meritless; 
4) The PC[R]A court conducting its own 
independent review of the record; and 
5) The PC[R]A court agreeing with counsel that 
the petition was meritless.” 
Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817-18 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 
876 n.1 (Pa. 2009)). 
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 Jenkins next contends that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court‟s defective filing notice misled him into believing that 
his pleading was holding a place for him on its allocatur 
docket.  We resolved a similar claim in Munchinski, 694 F.3d 
308.  There, the Common Pleas Court erroneously dismissed 
the prisoner‟s second PCRA petition for lack of jurisdiction 
because his first habeas appeal was pending before us.  Id. at 
319.  The Common Pleas Court thereby implicitly suggested 
that the prisoner could later reassert his claims in a third 
PCRA petition.  Id. at 319-20.  The prisoner relied on this 
advice, id., but on the appeal of his third PCRA petition, the 
Superior Court concluded that the allegations that he had 
previously raised had become untimely, id. at 328.  Under 
these facts, we held that the Common Pleas Court‟s implicit 
suggestion “was sufficiently misleading as to constitute an 
extraordinary circumstance because „it later operate[d] to 
prevent [the prisoner] from pursuing his rights.‟”  Id. at 330 
(quoting Urcinoli, 546 F.3d at 275). 
 If Jenkins were not already entitled to statutory tolling 
of AEDPA‟s limitation period, the same analysis would 
appear to apply here.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s 
defective filing notice informed Jenkins that his pleading 
failed to comply with certain Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  Importantly, the notice did not indicate that 
Jenkins‟s pleading was untimely.  In other words, by 
explicitly directing Jenkins to cure certain filing defects, the 
notice implied that his pleading otherwise satisfied the Rules 
not referenced therein, including Rule 105(b).  Relying on the 
notice, Jenkins promptly perfected his pleading and 
reasonably waited for the Supreme Court‟s decision.  If the 
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notice had stated instead that his pleading was untimely, 
Jenkins could have timely filed his habeas petition.  Based on 
Jenkins‟s demonstrated diligence, the Supreme Court‟s notice 
seems to have been an extraordinary circumstance that 
prevented the timely filing of his habeas petition and would 
have entitled him to equitable tolling, had we not already 
concluded that he is entitled to statutory tolling. 
IV. 
 For the reasons stated above, we hold that Jenkins is 
entitled to statutory tolling of AEDPA‟s limitation period.  
Therefore, we will reverse the District Court‟s order 
dismissing Jenkins‟s habeas petition as untimely and remand 
the case to the District Court for further proceedings. 
